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It is well known that, unless worker-rm match quality is controlled for, returns to rm tenure
(RTT) estimated directly via Mincer equations will be biased. In this paper we show that even if
match quality is properly accounted for there is a further pervasive source of bias, namely the
co-movement of rm employment and rm wages. In a simple analytical model we show that
positively covarying shocks (either aggregate or rm level) to a rms employment and its wages
cause downward bias in OLS regression estimates of RTT. We show that the long established
procedures for dealing with "traditional" RTT bias do not circumvent the additional problem we
have identied. We argue that rm-year xed e¤ects must be added to the standard Mincer
equations in order to eliminate this bias. Estimates from two large panel datasets from Germany
and Portugal show that the bias is empirically important. Compared with the average estimate
obtained from 4 traditional methods using our correction raises RTT in Germany (Portugal) by
about 2.5% (3.5%) of wages at 10 years of tenure  around 20% (45%) of the total RTT level
itself. Finally we show that the results extend to tenure correlates used in macroeconomics such
as the minimum unemployment rate since joining the rm.
This work was partly supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number
ES/L009633/1] and the priority program 1764 of the German Research Foundation (DFG).
1 Introduction and Overview
There is a large empirical literature that attempts to identify and consistently estimate
returns to rm tenure (RTT for short). The aim of this literature is to obtain the pure
"causal e¤ect of tenure on wages" (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987), the e¤ect on the wage of
one more year of tenure, holding constant years of experience and job match quality broadly
interpreted. In turn this causal e¤ect is implicitly or explicitly viewed as being a measure
of the returns to rm specic human capital and/or to contractual mechanisms that reward
tenure for incentive reasons. The traditional approach is to use coe¢ cient estimates of wages
on deterministic tenure in a Mincer regression to obtain a measure of RTT. This reduced form
method is easy to implement and avoids having to make structural economic assumptions
about worker entry and exit from the rm.
However, the existence of unobservable wage shocks that drive rm hiring and worker
exit may complicate the interpretation of reduced form estimates; their existence will make
tenure endogenous. Put another way, in the presence of such shocks, reduced form estimates
cannot be interpreted as the causal e¤ect of tenure on wages. Much of the past literature
has focused on worker-rm match quality as the key unobservable confounding factor for
RTT. In particular if we believe that better matches tend to last longer, tenure will be
endogenous and failing to control for match quality will induce upward bias in reduced-form
RTT estimates. Three canonical methods have been used to circumvent this problem: i) the
two step estimator of Topel (1991), ii) the IV approach of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and
iii) the method of controlling for completed tenure of Abraham and Farber (1987).1 More
recently the emergence of very large panel datasets that record complete work histories
of workers have allowed investigators to absorb unobserved match quality by adding rm-
worker match xed e¤ects (see for example Battisti, 2012). The downside of doing this is
that as in Topels (1991) method the estimated tenure e¤ect will include the e¤ect of
linear experience and this must be backed out using an auxiliary regression. The upside
however is that it automatically controls for the impact of time invariant worker and rm
heterogeneity; employing xed e¤ects for this purpose avoids the concern that RTT estimates
may be sensitive to the investigators selection of controls. A specication that controls for
match quality using worker-rm interaction (match) xed e¤ects provides us with our fourth
"traditional" method for eliminating the upward bias in RTT due to unobserved match
quality.
In this paper we identify a further and potentially equally pervasive source of bias to
RTT: the existence of a time-varying wage component that is common to all a rms workers
but that comoves with its employment. We argue that even in a world where match quality
is irrelevant, the failure to account for these wage components will bias estimates of returns
to tenure, and most likely in a downwards direction. The mechanism generating the bias
is simple: suppose rms that have a relatively high (low) wage at time t also have high
1For a recent example of an application of the rst two of these methods see Devereux et al. (2013).
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(low) employment, high (low) hiring and low (high) average rm tenure at t.2 This induces
negative feedback from equal treatment wage shocks to tenure. In this paper we show that
traditional estimators  ones designed to eliminate the e¤ects of unobservable worker/rm
match quality  are not immune to potentially sizeable biases arising from this e¤ect.
Drivers of a rms wage/employment comovements may include both aggregate (business
cycle) shocks and rm-specic shocks. In both cases the shocks that are the root cause of the
problem are assumed to impact all workers in the rm. We call these common components
of wages equal treatment shocks following the relevant macro literature (see, e.g., Snell and
Thomas, 2010, Gertler and Trigari, 2009, and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2013, for macro
models subject to within-rm equal treatment). Because equal treatment shocks are the
same for each worker in a rm in a particular year, we propose that they be controlled for
via the addition of rm-year interaction xed e¤ects3 to panel wage regressions whilst at the
same time also controlling for the more traditional match-quality problem.
In an empirical application we use two large samples drawn from matched panel datasets
from Germany and Portugal to show that the four traditional methods produce RTT es-
timates that are substantially lower than that obtained using our proposed correction. If
we take the average RTT estimate from the four traditional methods as a benchmark then
adding rm-year xed e¤ects to wage equations (whilst controlling for worker-rm match
quality) increases estimated RTT in Germany (Portugal) by about 2.5% (3.5%) of wages at
10 years of tenure. This amounts to about 20% (40%) of the bias-corrected RTT level itself.
Although investigators may have been aware of this problem (see for example a discussion
in Topel, 1991, on high wage/employment growth rms), to the best of our knowledge we
are the rst to quantify its importance and to propose a (simple) solution.
One interesting supplementary result from our estimation method is that the tted rm-
year xed e¤ects appear to follow a unit root; like unobserved match quality, the equal
treatment shocks also appear to have a permanent impact on a workers wages within a rm.
Given that entry into and exit out of a rm are likely driven by permanent (rather than
transient) wage shocks, this is consistent with our nding that equal treatment shocks cause
bias in RTT estimates. It suggests that if one wishes to obtain the causal e¤ects of tenure
on wages, one must control for all permanent wage shocks whether they arise from equal
treatment shocks or from match quality.
A further implication of our results is that using regressors that interact macroeconomic
variables, such as unemployment, with deterministic tenure, will also result in biased infer-
ence. Canonical examples of such variables are Beaudry and DiNardos (1991) minimum
unemployment rate during a workers tenure ("minu"), and a new hire dummy interacted
with unemployment to measure the incremental cyclicality of new hire wages. The empirical
2There is also a steady state cross-sectional e¤ect: high-paying rms tend to have low labour turnover,
and hence longer tenure. However this type of time invariant cross-sectional e¤ect is usually removed via
the addition of rm xed e¤ects.
3Aggregate business cycle shocks can be controlled for by including time xed e¤ects; in fact we nd that
shocks below the aggregate level account for almost all of the bias.
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importance of these variates found in the literature adds a further twist because their omis-
sion from Mincer equations will be yet another source of bias to RTT estimates. Another
way of saying this is that if wage growth within the rm contains both the e¤ects of human
capital and implicit contracts, then to consistently estimate these separate e¤ects requires
inclusion of the relevant contract variate (e.g. minu) and rm-year xed e¤ects. We examine
some of these issues in section 3 below.4
The key result in this paper, that there is yet another source of pervasive bias to RTT
estimates obtained via reduced form estimation, may lead the investigator to conclude that
a safer way to proceed is via a fully specied structural model of wage shocks and worker
mobility (see Buchinsky et al., 2010, for a recent example of such a model). However one
key nding of our work is that it is rm specic (heterogeneous) comovement that drives the
biases we nd, and not macro (aggregate) e¤ects. A structural model with heterogeneous
rm hiring (and ring)  as opposed to cyclically related hiring  may be hard to specify
and identify empirically. Additionally, estimates gleaned from structural models may be only
as good as the veracity of their underlying assumptions. As far as reduced form modeling
goes, our paper has a clear message: to avoid substantial RTT bias one must not only control
for worker-rm match quality, but also for equal treatment shocks.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 revisits the traditional econometric model of
RTT and the implications for wages. We outline the four traditional estimation methods of
Topel (1991), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Abraham and Farber (1987) and the addition
of match xed e¤ects. We estimate RTT for these methods using Portuguese and German
panel data and plot the corresponding RTT proles together with that obtained using our
proposed correction. We then o¤er an anatomy of the bias from a theoretical and empirical
viewpoint. Importantly, here we show that the bias is driven by heterogenous (across rms)
employment/wage comovements. Section 3 looks at the implications of our analysis when
contractual variables play a role, in particular tenure related maro variables associated with
wage contracts. Section 4 o¤ers concluding comments.
2 Estimates of RTT: AComparison of Traditional Meth-
ods and the Corrected Method
In this section we estimate RTT using the four traditional methods outlined above and
compare the implied RTT proles obtained with that using our proposed correction for rm
employment/wage comovements. To begin with, we revisit the bias caused by unobserved
match quality and outline the methods that were designed to deal with it. We call these four
methods T (Topel), AS (Altonji and Shakotko), AF (Abraham and Farber) and the addition
of match xed e¤ects, MFE. To do so we use a somewhat simplied archetypal model of
4There may of course be other sources of wage growth within the rm arising from wage contracts, such
as backloading, for which observable controls are not available. We discuss these issues in section 3 below.
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RTT. We assume that log wages wijt for worker i in rm j at time t are given by
wijt =  + ijt + Eit + "ijt; (1)
with "ijt = ij +$jt + uijt , (2)
where ijt is the workers tenure, Eit is her lifetime work experience. The error consists of job
match quality ij (which also may include a worker and rm xed e¤ect), an idiosyncratic
error, uijt; which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors (especially tenure) and
an equal treatment wage component $jt  the innovation in our study. The coe¢ cient 
is the per year RTT within the rm.5 The traditional problem (dealt with in T, AS etc.)
arises when the job match quality ij is correlated with worker is tenure. When the match
is good (high ij), the workers separation hazard may fall (see in particular Bowlus, 1995),
and expected tenure will rise. This makes tenure endogenous and biases  upwards. The
aspiration of the traditional RTT estimation methods is to estimate the causal e¤ect of
tenure on wages in the presence of unobserved match quality ij. The point of this paper
is to show that the existence of equal treatment wage elements ($jt) in addition to match
quality, undermine this aspiration.
Topels (1991) method is to rst-di¤erence incumbentswages to remove the (presumed
time invariant) match quality. In the absence of$jt; regressing these incumbent wage changes
on an intercept would, in this model at least, produce a consistent estimate of  + ,\ + 
say. In order to separately identify  and , Topel (1991) proposed estimating a second-stage
regression of wijt (\ + )ijt on the workers initial experience on entry to the rm. Provided
the latter is not correlated with job match quality, an admittedly strong assumption,6 this
produces a consistent estimate of . Subtracting the latter estimate from \ +  gives a
consistent estimate of . Altonji and Shakotko (1987) proposed an IV method whereby
tenure is instrumented by the deviation of tenure from its spell mean fijt. By construction
this variable is orthogonal to (constant within spell) match quality. Again in the absence of
$jt this would o¤er consistent estimates of .7 Abraham and Farber (1987) propose adding
duration  the nal ex post tenure of the worker at the rm  as a regressor. If workers
with better matches have longer completed tenure  as the traditional bias story goes 
5In more general contexts where RTT are heterogenous across workers and/or rms,  could be interpreted
as the average RTT or average treatment e¤ect in the words of the experimental literature.
6Topel (1991) argued that more experienced workers are likely to form better matches, in line with "job
shopping" models of search. If true, returns to experience will be overestimated in the second stage and
tenure underestimated  his RTT estimates are a lower bound. He considers in detail two further sources of
bias: Frequent job changers may be less productive in which case more able workersinitial experience will
tend to be lower, leading to  being underestimated. Secondly jobs o¤ering low wage growth may survive
with a lower probability than higher wage growth jobs. This could lead to an overestimate of  + . Topel
(1991) gives evidence to suggest that these biases are not likely to be signicant; we discuss the issue further
in Section 2.5.
7As with Topel (1991) this requires that experience is not correlated with job match quality. If it is
positively correlated, again presumably because of job shopping, then the estimate of  will be biased
upwards and that of  downward biased although, they argue that this e¤ect is relatively small (see Altonji
and Shakotko, 1987, pp. 450453).
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then controlling for completed tenure directly should eliminate the bias in .8 Finally the
MFE method adds match xed e¤ects to the estimation process. This focuses on within
match variation in tenure. As was the case with Topel, within match de-meaned tenure and
de-meaned within match experience are the same variable and the latter must be dropped
from the estimation. The result is that the coe¢ cient on tenure becomes an estimate of
 + . To estimate   and hence   one would use Topels second stage (above).
All of these methods ignore the existence of the equal treatment wage components $jt.
If these components positively comove with rm employment then they will be negatively
correlated with rm average tenure and this will induce downward bias in estimates of . We
propose to augment the MFE estimator with rm-year interaction xed e¤ects (FYFE). The
FYFE will absorb the equal treatment wage components and eliminate the bias arising from
wage/employment comovements. As with MFE and Topel we use a second stage regression
of wijt   (\ + )ijt on the workers experience at entry to the rm to obtain an estimate of
. If it is true that more experienced workers do nd better matches (and this e¤ect does
have signicant traction) then the estimated  will be upward biased and RTT downward
biased. At worst therefore, the RTT prole produced by FYFE will be a lower bound for
the true RTT.9
2.1 Data
We draw our data from the German BeH and the Portuguese QP. Before discussing our
subsamples we give a brief overview of these two well known data sources. We then describe
the samples and the cleaningoperations we perform on them.
The BeH data set is organized by worker spells. A spell is a portion of a year spent at
a single rm. For the BeH, if a worker stays with one rm throughout the year the average
daily wage for that "spell" forms a single datapoint. If the worker moves to a second rm
within the year there will be two spells that year; the average wage at each rm would form
a separate datapoints for that year. By contrast, the QP is an annual survey that records
data on each worker at only one point in the year (census date in March up to 1993 and in
October from 1994 onwards). For QP then there is only one worker spellper year.
The BeH draws data from the totality of gainfully employed members of the German
population who are covered by the social security system. Not covered are self-employed,
family workers assisting in the operation of a family business, civil servants (Beamte) and
regular students. The BeH covers roughly 80% of the German workforce. We focus solely on
workers employed in states of the former West Germany. Plausibility checks performed by
the social security institutions and the existence of legal sanctions for misreporting guarantee
8Under their assumption that initial experience is only correlated with match quality through total job
duration.
9In the presence of the mechanism identied in this paper, an additional likely upward bias exists in the
estimation of  (and hence an additional downward bias in RTT). See footnote 18 below.
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that the earnings data are very reliable  in contrast with interview based wage data such
as that in, say, the PSID (for the US) or the SOEP (for Germany).
Unfortunately the BeH only documents total spell earnings and not hours worked in that
spell. We therefore only consider full-time workers. Nearly all full-time workers in Germany
work a standard number of hours per week so the average daily wage should be very closely
related to the hourly wage. To calculate the daily real wage (in 2005 prices) we use Germanys
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Another problem is that wages are censored at a maximum level
equal to the contribution assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme.10
Earnings spells with wages above or close to (within 1% of) the truncation point are dropped.
We drop all spells that have missing tenure. This means a worker only enters the data when
he joins a rm after Jan. 1, 1975.11 For this reason and in order to match the data period
used for Portugal, we drop the rst 12 years and use worker spells dated at 1986 and beyond.
The QP covers all workers except the self-employed and those employed in the public
sector; of course, the unemployed and the inactive are also not included. There are several
wage variables, all of them expressed in monthly values (the most common type of pay in
Portugal), including base wages, tenure-related payments, overtime pay, subsidies and other
payments(this latter category includes bonuses and prot- or performance-related pay). All
QP wages have been deated using Portugals CPI and are expressed in 2005 euros. There
is also information about normal hours and overtime hours per month. The benchmark
measure of pay adopted in this study is based on the sum of all ve types of pay divided
by the sum of the two types of hours worked, resulting in a measure of total hourly pay.
Tenure  in both datasets  is measured (in rounded years) as the current year minus the
reported start year.
From the QP we sample all workers from the 127 largest rms that existed throughout
the entire period 19862009. From the BeH we sample all full-time full-year worker spells
from the 100 largest (West German) rms12 that existed throughout the same time period.13
The motivation for using large rms is to enable us to get good estimates of the $jt for
subsequent analysis. An additional reason to focus on a relatively small number of rms
is to allow a subsequent computation of diagnostic regressions (below) that involve more
than 2n regressors with two dimensional xed e¤ects. Of course estimated RTT of workers
10In a sensitivity analysis in Snell et. al. (2016) we found that our core result  the downward bias when
FYFE are not controlled for  was robust with respect to articially censoring the highest wages in our
already censored sample. This suggest the original censorship is not impacting our results.
11For the analysis we only use the years 19862009, but for the identication of rm entrants and the
calculation of rm-tenure we use BeH data from 1975 onwards. However, we exclude all spells starting Jan.
1, 1975 because the tenure could be left censored.
12The BeH reports establishment level data and the QP rm level data. In the paper we refer to both as
"rms".
13Focusing on full-year spells eliminates anomalies such as supposed full time workers working for two rms
at the same time and workers who have short tenured jobs. It also gives a cleaner approach to estimating
within rm wage growth - especially when we use rst di¤erences (Topel) in a regression. Finally having
a maximum of one observation per worker per year makes the German sample more comparable to the
Portuguese.
6
in large rms may not be representative of RTT that exist in the economy at large. But,
in an earlier version of this paper (Snell et al. , 2016) we showed that our main result 
that there is substantial downward RTT bias if you fail to control for equal treatment wage
components  is robust with respect to changing the sample to a) one consisting of the 1000
largest rms and to b) a randomly drawn sample of 10000 (mostly small) rms.
Despite the small number of rms, the sample still yields around 3.3 million datapoint for
Portugal and 12.8 million datapoints for Germany, around 5% and 3% of the total available
data from the QP and BeH respectively over this period. We also observe a substantial
proportion of workers in more than one rm  just under 5% of workers in the Portuguese
data and just under 10% in the German. These are higher proportions than one would expect
if workers joined rms randomly. This suggests that the labour markets within which these
large rms operate have a high degree of segmentation from the rest of the labour market.
Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics14
Portugal Germany
Average log monthly wage (2005 Euros) 7:01 7:91
s.d. of log monthly wage :637 :260
s.d. of log average annual rm employment :882 :760
Average Tenure (Years) 12:9 9:26
s.d. of Tenure 10:2 7:28
Number of Worker Spells Per Firm Per Year 1172 5278
Number of Years Available (19862009)15 22 24
Number of Tenure Categories Available 51 36
Average Firm Size in QP and BeH in 1997 9:5 14:6
Table 1 o¤ers some summary statistics from the two samples. It shows some stark
di¤erences in the two samples and in the two labour markets. Aside from average wages
being very much lower in our Portuguese sample (as we would expect) wages are over twice as
variable therein. Average tenure however is substantial in both samples. Average separation
rates (which can be backed out from average tenure) are around 10% per year, considerably
lower than the 30% level in the US (see for example Holbijn and S¸ahin, 2007). The sixth and
last lines give the average rm sizes in our core sample of 100 large rms and in the wider
"economy" (as recorded in the QP and BeH). Firms in general are smaller in Portugal than
Germany. Our samples also indicate that variation in size may be higher in Portugal than
in Germany. The stark di¤erences in the labour markets is reassuring for our analysis; if we
nd similar results from both countries then those results will have greater external validity
than those based on a single dataset.
14Worker level data for 1990 and 2001 are not available from the QP. For comparison purposes we present
average establishment size in both cases. Average rm size in Portugal is marginally higher at 11:0
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2.2 Implementation of the Methods and Estimates
We generalise the tenure function in (1) by allowing RTT to follow a quartic function.16
Experience is modeled via a quadratic function17 and we control for business cycles and
common trends using year xed e¤ects in all methods. We control for time invariant worker
heterogeneity using rst di¤erences in Topel, match xed e¤ects in MFE and FYFE and
worker xed e¤ects in the other specications. We now give specic implementation details
method by method.
Topel : For the rst stage in Topel we estimate the following regression using data only
on incumbents:
wijt =  + 2
2
ijt + 3
3
ijt + 4
4
ijt + 2E
2
ijt + uijt:
The estimate of , b say, gives an estimate of 1+1+1 where 1 and 1 are the linear terms
of the quartics in, respectively, tenure and experience and 1 is the linear trend. We then
regress the levels "residual" wijt bijt  b2 2ijt  b3 3ijt  b4 4ijt  b2E2ijt on E0jt and (ijt  trt)
where E0 is initial experience on joining the rm and tr is a time index. The coe¢ cients
from this second regression (b1 and b1) are consistent estimates under our assumptions,
respectively, of 1 and 1. The estimate of 1 is then obtained as b1 = b  b1  b1.18
MFE and FYFE : For the rst stage in MFE we estimate
wijt = 

1ijt + 2
2
ijt + 3
3
ijt + 4
4
ijt + 2E
2
ijt + ij + uijt (3)
using match xed e¤ects to control for match quality ij. To estimate FYFE we add rm-
year interaction xed e¤ects to (3). Due to the addition of match xed e¤ects the estimated
linear tenure coe¢ cientc1 in MFE and FYFE is an estimate of 1+1. Unlike Topel, where
the linear tenure coe¢ cient also include the e¤ect of trend, here the deterministic trend is
identied separately and absorbed in the year and rm-year xed e¤ects respectively.19 To
obtain a consistent estimate of 1 we regress the levels residual wijt c1ijt  b2 2ijt  b3 3ijt 
16We also tried adding a tenure zero dummy to the quartic to capture any additional wage e¤ect of being
a new hire that the quartic specication cannot easily capture; while we nd that there is a signicant pay
increase in the rst year, in line with previous work (e.g., Altonji and Shakotko, 1987, Table 1) the impact
on RTT is small in both datasets; likewise the bias we nd is virtually unchanged.
17In Snell et. al. (2016) we found that the bias in MFE (RTT from FYFE minus that from MFE) was
virtually unchanged when we generalised the experience function to a quartic.
18Because ; by the reasoning of the paper, is downward biased, for this to be a consistent consistent
estimate of 1 requires an additional assumption, that initial experience is uncorrelated with duration as
well as match quality (if they are positively correlated then 1 will be upward biased and RTT downward
biased). This applies equally to the second stage of MFE below. But if experience is only correlated with
match quality via its correlation with duration as assumed in AF then this is not an additional assumption.
19Topel argues that the estimate of deterministic trends from levels are upward biased because of the
secular tendency for worker quality to improve. For this reason he uses an extraneous trend estimate.
However this critique does not apply to MFE and FYFE because in those specications match quality of
every worker is controlled for via match xed e¤ects.
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b4 4ijt  b2E2ijt on initial experience. This coe¢ cient is subtracted fromc1 to give our estimate
of 1.
AF: In AF we simply add the within match variate  cij  completed tenure  to the
main regression. For workers whose tenure is incomplete  "ongoing" workers in 2009  we
may either use imputed values or the actual value of tenure in 2009. We experimented with
two imputations: i) we assumed constant exit hazards after 2009 and ii) we used the sample
of workers with completed tenures to compute the expected additional tenure of workers with
 years of tenure in 2009. Both imputation methods produced proles virtually identical to
that obtained from using the value of nal tenure itself and so we simply present the prole
from the latter.
AS: For AS we adjust the tenure terms by subtracting their respective within match
means. For example  3ijt becomes 
3
ijt    3ijt where denotes within match mean. These
variates are used as instruments for the tenure terms in a (2SLS) IV regression.
2.3 Results
The estimates and standard errors of the quartic tenure parameters, i , i = 1; : : : 4; for
the four "traditional" methods (T, AF, AS and MFE) together with the corrected method
(FYFE) are presented in Table A1 of the online appendix. The coe¢ cient estimates are
quite hard to map into RTT itself  which is the object of interest here. More informative
is the RTT tenure proles implied by these estimates. We plot these proles for values of
tenure from 0 to 20 years in Figure 1 (Portugal) and Figure 2 (Germany).
The graphs show that AS, AF and MFE o¤er similar RTT estimates.20 The methods
themselves are in fact quite close. Both AS and MFE measure the tenure regressors in the
same way i.e. as deviations from match mean. In fact in the absence of other regressors
the 2SLS tenure estimates of AS would be identical to those of MFE. As far as AF goes, if
completed tenure is a good proxy for match quality, then AF will also e¤ect an approximate
within spell demeaning of the regressors.
By contrast with the other three methods,Topels method produces RTT estimates that
are quite low and the dynamic pattern is also somewhat di¤erent. Of course Topel uses a
20The 10-year tenure e¤ects for the traditonal estimators are broadly in line with what Altonji and Williams
(2005) nd for the U.S. in their reappraisal of earlier work. The fact that tenure proles are falling at higher
tenures is not unusual in the literature. For example in Altonji and Williamsreplication exercise, when,
as here, the time trend is controlled for using time dummies and a quartic in tenure is included, the IV1
estimates (AS here) have a falling tenure prole above 5 or 10 years depending on the specication, while
Topels method yields the same at 10 and 20 years in one of the two specications reported (Table 3 and
footnote 12). When they adjust the relative timing of wage and tenure measures they nd the tenure e¤ect
is negative above 10 years for both AS and T (Table 5).
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rst di¤erenced specication in contrast to the levels of MFE, AF and AS - an important
di¤erence that sets Topel apart from the other methods. At the same time we should
also point out that the standard errors of Topels estimates are quite high for Portugal
suggesting that the corresponding RTT schedule is not as precisely estimate as the others.
For Germany, Topels estimates are better determined but once again the corresponding RTT
lie substantially below that of the other three methods and this is quite hard to rationalise.21
The key point however is that in both datasets the corrected RTT prole lies substantially
above that of the other four methods.22 The purest measure of the impact on RTT of adding
rm-year xed e¤ects can be seen by looking at the vertical gap between FYFE and MFE
because the two methods di¤er only by the application of our proposed correction. This
shows a substantial bias in the case of Portuguese data with FYFE lying 2.4% of wages
above MFE at 10 years of tenure around 30% of the RTT level itself although the gap
falls somewhat as tenure grows towards 20 years. For Germany it is the other way around.
MFEs RTT lies only 1.3% of wages below FYFE at 10 years of tenure but the gap grows
to around 2.5% of wages as tenure increases to 20 years. If we repeat these calculations
using the average of the four traditional methods as a baseline then the "bias" is of course
considerably larger.
We have shown that our corrected RTT prole (FYFE) lies substantially above that of
the other four methods. We now try and expose and understand better the source of these
di¤erences.
2.4 An Analysis of the Source of The Bias
We argued above that positive comovement of rm employment and rm wages is a new
(i.e., uninvestigated) source of bias in RTT estimates; when a rms employment and wages
rise (fall) together, its average tenure falls (rises) and tenure becomes endogenous. To get a
better analytical handle on how this mechanism works we use a simple model which o¤ers
a "sketch" of the mechanism at work. The model has only a single regressor  tenure 
with a regression error consisting only of equal treatment e¤ects. Explicitly we consider the
21Reversing the original ndings in the literature. Altonji and Williams (2005) argue that the reason for
Topels (1991) nding of a much higher RTT than previously estimated is to a substantial extent accounted
for by his use of a secular wage trend from an alternative data source (using a CPS-based wage index rather
than from the PSID panel he uses in his estimations, as was the case in Altonji and Shakotko, 1987, and
Abraham and Farber, 1987, and here), and his use of lagged wages with current tenure. They also argue,
in contrast to Topel, that individual heterogeneity biases the return to experience downwards in T (but not
AS), and so RTT upwards, as discussed in footnote 6.
22Condence bands are not displayed to avoid cluttering the graph; however a 95% condence interval
around Portugals FYFE curve excludes all the other curves when tenure is below 18 years. The FYFE
prole for Germany is less well dened and its condence interval is wider; nonetheless it still excludes all of
the other curves when tenure exceeds 12 years.
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panel data regression of (log) wages on individual tenure
wijt =  + ijt +$jt; (4)
where symbols are as previously dened. We ignore match xed e¤ects and the usual idio-
syncratic regression error here because we wish to focus on the object of interest  bias
caused by the existence of $jt and its comovement with rm employment at time t , Ljt say.
We assume that the data comes from all workers in n large rms that exist over T years
with total number of observations N (=
PT
t=1
Pn
j=1 Ljt). We discuss the interpretation of
$jt below but for now and for illustrative purposes we take $jt to be (proportional to) a
mean zero shock to rm prots.
Standard textbook theory tells us that OLS bias in the estimate of  will arise if tenure
has a nonzero covariance with the error. The sample covariance of tenure with the regression
error in (4) is
scov =
1
N
TX
t=1
nX
j=1
$jt
LjtX
i=1
(ijt   ); 23 (5)
where  is the sample mean tenure. We can rewrite the term in braces to get
scov =
1
N
TX
t=1
nX
j=1
$jt
LjtX
i=1
f(ijt    jt) + ( jt   )g: (6)
where  jt is rm js average tenure and  is the "long run" average tenure for all rms. The
rst braced summation term is by denition zero so we can simplify to get
scov =
1
N
TX
t=1
nX
j=1
$jt
LjtX
i=1
( jt   ) (7)
=
1
N
TX
t=1
nX
j=1
$jtLjt( jt   ): (8)
Now suppose in year t there is positive comovement between rm js hiring and its prot
shock $jt. E¤ectively this means that rms currently experiencing above average prots
(i.e..$jt > 0) will have above average employment, above average hiring and lower than
average tenure. Hence ( jt    t) will be negative and $jtLjt positive for such rms (vice
versa for rms experiencing a negative prots shock). The net e¤ect is to make scov  the
OLS bias  negative
Note that the above logic would apply to a random sample (rather than a complete
sample) of workers from these rms: a randomly chosen worker that has a higher than average
23In this illustration we abuse notation by indexing each rms workers in the same way, i.e., worker
i = 1; :::; Ljt., when in fact the identity of workers at time t in rm j will vary from year to year.
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wage is more likely to have come from a rm that has high levels of current employment
(and high levels of hiring) than from one with low and that rm is more likely to have
average tenure below the average for the economy as a whole. The bias argument goes
through unchanged. One thing that does change when we have only a random sample of
workers is our ability to reliably estimate and control for equal treatment e¤ects $jt. In fact
in random worker samples we are likely to see very few workers working at the same rm
making identication and controlling for $jt practically impossible. This is one reason we
chose a sample of rms rather than a sample of workers.
The preceding arguments were an analytical sketch of the main mechanism. In section
A2 of the online appendix we develop a more formal model of the bias. Our benchmark
model is (1) with (2). The key additional assumptions are that there are complete data on
all workers in a small number of long lived large rms (o¤ering a large number of data points
in each year in each rm), that there is an exogenous worker exit/quit rate which we allow to
be di¤erent in each rm, that a workers initial experience on entering the rm is exogenous.
The model also admits a completely general set of xed e¤ects. We nd that the RTT bias is
a weighted average (across rms) of the comovements between a rms wage and its current
and lagged employment levels. A key special case occurs when comovements between current
wages and current employment are positive whilst those between current wages and lagged
employment are zero. In this case the biases from each of the four methods are negative.
When we generalise to allow current wage to comove with lagged employment as well this
turns out to be relatively unimportant in determining the bias. It is the contemporaneous
wage/employment comovement that matters most.
2.5 The Economic Mechanism Behind the Bias
Our primary claim is that the existence of equal treatment wage components that drive
employment are an important source of RTT bias. We argue in Section 2.6 that it is move-
ments in these components below the macro level that matter. We now try and justify that
claim. First we discuss some models that are consistent with our approach. Then we look
at the nature of the shocks we have identied and argue that they are consistent with our
contention.
Consider a standard search-matching framework adapted to large rms (see Elsby and
Michaels, 2013), with continuous bargaining.24 Positive comovement of wages with em-
ployment requires for example the higher wages after a positive rm shock be associated
24To be consistent with the basic model outlined in (1) and (2) we could incorporate accumulation of general
and job specic capital and random match quality, with all three translating multiplicatively into e¢ ciency
units of labor and hence wages. The latter would however depend on the bargaining protocol: The fact that
a worker loses specic capital and idiosyncratic job match quality on leaving the rm would a¤ect the outside
option, so that the bargained wage may not be identical for each e¢ ciency unit. (Elsby and Michaels, 2013,
use the Stole-Zwiebel bargaining solution.) If shocks to rm productivity also a¤ect individual productivity
multiplicatively, they will a¤ect log wages of all workers including new hires approximately equally.
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with more matches being made/fewer separations; in Elsby and Michaels (2013) a posi-
tive/negative shock to a rms productivity of su¢ cient size will lead to the rm increas-
ing/decreasing its vacancies and hence hiring/laying o¤ workers. A similar story could be
told in a rent sharing or union model where positive shocks to a rms price or productivity
leads to higher employment, prots, and wages of all workers.
A number of wage posting models with on-the-job search exhibit positive tenure e¤ects
even in the absence of specic capital accumulation. For example Burdett and Coles (2003)
show that with risk-averse workers wage-tenure contracts can arise, in which wages increase
with tenure. The function of this backloading is to prevent turnover  rms cannot respond
to outside o¤ers but higher pay for higher tenured workers makes better outside o¤ers less
likely.25 In equilibrium di¤erent rms start new workers at di¤erent points on the same tenure
ladder. This leads to wage shopping and hence experience e¤ects. Bagger et al. (2014) look
at a related model but in which rms can match outside o¤ers. Wages rise with tenure but
stochastically, because the rm responds to outside o¤ers (there is no point in backloading).
These models for tractability typically do not have rm specic shocks of the type we have in
mind (in Burdett and Coles, 2003, rms are identical, while in Bagger et al., 2014, they have
di¤erent but xed productivity). Nevertheless, in this general class of models, it would be
expected that a positive rm productivity shock would increase the incentive for the rm to
hire (by raising the wage prole and hence the utility of a contract o¤ered to new hires) and
to want to increase incumbent pay (to reduce turnover); so one would see highly correlated
wage shocks across workers in the rm associated with an increase in employment (and vice
versa for negative shocks).26
Models in which equal treatment (in the form of equal pay per e¢ ciency unit) is imposed
or derived, more straightforwardly lead to the empirical relationship hypothesised here (see,
e.g., Snell and Thomas, 2010, Gertler and Trigari, 2009), when combined with a monopsonis-
tic setting so that higher wages are needed to increase employment (or a competitive setting
but with segmented labor markets so that positive industry shocks to productivity lead to
higher industry wages and employment). In a model of on- and o¤-the-job search with equal
treatment (so a rm cannot respond to outside o¤ers as it pays all workers the same within
a period), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) analyze the e¤ect of aggregate shocks on wage
contracts. When positive shocks occur, for example, larger rms expand more rapidly than
smaller ones, and contract more rapidly in downswings (however they cannot consider idio-
syncratic shocks as the equilibrium of the model can only be characterized when rm size
ranking is preserved).
If mechanisms of the type described above are generating positive wage/employment
comovements su¢ cient to underlie the bias, we would expect to nd evidence that the wage
25Note that retention operates in the same direction: in these models, a decrease in rm wages following
a negative shock, for example, will lead to workers with shorter tenure disproportionatly quitting (as they
are more sensitive to outside o¤ers), thus lengthening tenure. Likewise if the rm is laying o¤ workers in
response to a negative shock in a "last in, rst out" model, tenure will lengthen.
26A related model to that of Bagger et al. (2014) that also has investment in specic and general training
is Lentz and Roys (2015).
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model we estimate generates a su¢ cient change in the present value of wages to attract
new/retain older workers when positive shocks occur, and vice versa with negative shocks.27
It is highly unlikely that transient shocks to wages will have any e¤ect at all on attracting
labor. By contrast permanent or highly persistent movements in a rms wage will very
likely a¤ect its hiring, worker entry and worker exit.
Because our sample contains large numbers of workers per rm per year we can estimate
each rm-year equal treatment component and examine its persistence/transience. Treating
the estimated rm-year xed e¤ects from the FYFE specication as data we computed the
rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cients ( say) in a balanced panel regression. The  values
for Portugal and Germany were :92 and :99 respectively suggesting unit root or near unit
root behaviour.28 Additionally we nd that the residual from the FYFE, after eliminating
the equal treatment shocks and match e¤ects, was close to white noise ( values of  :015 and
:115 respectively).29 It seems then that in our data at least the two sources of permanent
movements in a workerswage within the rm appear to be the match e¤ect (permanent by
denition) and the equal treatment shocks. This nding is at odds with the assumption in
Buhai and Teulings (2014) that it is within rm idiosyncratic wage shocks that drive the unit
root in wages. In their model it is these shocks (together with a similar process for outside
options) not equal treatment shocks that drive labour reallocations. Were it true that
idiosyncratic shocks had this property and played this role then any attempts to estimate
RTT via a reduced form (Mincer) method would be confounded at the outset because 
almost by denition we cannot control for these shocks in standard regression analysis.
Our nding that idiosyncratic shocks appear to be white noise is important therefore; it is
consistent with the idea that it is equal treatment shocks that drive the unit root behavior
in wages instead.30
It would be interesting to see if the equal treatment shocks we have estimated correlate
with rm productivity and/or its product price a topic for future research. If this turned
out to be true our results would be consistent with the hypothesis that these shocks drive
27This is particularly true of the wage-posting models which rely on wages to attract new workers/retain
existing workers.
28Unit root behaviour of a workers wage within a rm is a stylised fact in labour markets. See for example
Buhai et al. (2014).
29Under the null hypothesis that the idiosyncratic wage components follow a unit root and that workers
quit the rm when the value of this process falls below some value c*, we can show that the empirical
autocorrelation coe¢ cient still tends to unity, so our results strongly suggest that this can be rejected.
However if the components are stationary (and again workers quit at some low threshold value) simulations
suggest that the autocorrelation coe¢ cient will underestimate the true degree of persistence.
30Topel (1991, pp.160-162) discusses the issue in some detail and nds no evidence that individual wage
growth di¤erences are related to contemporaneous mobility. Theoretically, if the process drivng a unit root
in the wage reects general human capital, then this should not a¤ect mobility as outside options will move
in tandem with inside returns. Likewise, timing is important: if it takes time to locate a new job after a
negative wage shock, so that mobility is only a¤ected after the period of the shock, there is no bias. Our
point is that even if persistent wage shocks do a¤ect contemporaneous mobility, so long as the persistence
arises only through the equal treatment component and this is controlled for as we are proposing, there will
be no bias.
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hiring and that rms share rents with their workers; following a positive (permanent) shock
to its product price or its productivity a prot maximizing rm would hire more workers
and, under equal treatment or bargaining, the newly hired and the incumbents would get
a share of the improved prots. In the next section we examine what our data has to say
about the role of rm specic wage/employment comovements in generating the di¤erences
we see in Figures 1 and 2.
2.6 The Role of Firm Specic Wage/Employment Comovements
If the assumptions and arguments we make in this paper are correct then the FYFE method
identies the causal e¤ect of tenure on wages. If initial experience is positively correlated
with match quality then the FYFE method at the very least o¤ers a lower bound on the
causal e¤ect of tenure on wages. In this section and henceforth we refer to di¤erences between
an estimated RTT prole from the FYFE method and another method as "bias". Use of
this term is for convenience and it comes with the obvious caveat that it is only correct
terminology if the assumptions and arguments we have made in the paper are true.
The contention of the paper is that comovement between rm wages and employment
leads to a bias in the estimation of  in (1) using traditional methods, and we have found this
bias to be negative and signicant, implying that the comovement is positive. In principle,
the positive comovement between rm wages and employment originating from the business
cycle could be one source of bias in line with this logic. However in our estimates we had
controlled for the business cycle via the addition of general year e¤ects. In Snell et al.
(2016) we found virtually no e¤ect on the bias of not controlling for the business cycle in
this way. The implication is that it is rm, locality or industry specic and not systemic
rm wage/employment comovements that are causing the problem.
Nevertheless, to control for rm specic wage/employment comovements, the inclusion
of current rm employment in the Mincer equation31 is a possible alternative approach to
adding FYFE. However it is easy to show that this will only remove the bias if the elasticities
of the wage/employment relationships, are identical across rms. If there is a large amount
of heterogeneity in these elasticities across rms, then this will not work.
Natural vehicles to investigate these issues empirically are the MFE and FYFE speci-
cations; they are nested and only di¤er because of the addition of rm-year xed e¤ects. We
did two exercises using these specications. In the rst we add (log of) rm employment
and lagged rm employment to the MFE specication32 allowing separate coe¢ cients for
each rm. The addition of these terms allows us to identify each rms wage/employment
31Buhai et al. (2014) call the impact of rm employment on wages the rm "size" e¤ect (although the
traditional view of the rm size e¤ect is a steady state notion). These traditional size e¤ects would be
typically absorbed using eihter rm xed e¤ects or match xed e¤ects.
32As before we allow for a quartic in tenure, a quadratic in experience and add year xed e¤ects.
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Figure 3: Contemporaneous Firm Wage/Employment Elasticities
and wage/lagged-employment elasticities33 and hence to see if these elasticities are heteroge-
nous. Note that the addition of lagged employment terms is purely in order to obtain better
estimates of the contemporaneous comovements; equation A1 in the online appendix shows
that in the current context lagged employment is of second order importance to the bias,
as discussed in Section 2.4. In the second exercise we add (log of) rm employment and
lagged rm employment with a single (i.e., common across rms) coe¢ cient. The idea here
is that if the elasticities we found in the rst exercise are homogeneous across rms then we
would expect the addition of these two terms to eliminate much of the RTT bias we found
in Figures 1 and 2. By contrast if there is substantial heterogeneity in the elasticities then
the bias will remain. In this case we might expect the rst exercise to eliminate much of the
RTT bias. For clarity we call the specication in exercise one the heterogeneous specication
and that in exercise two the homogeneous specication.
Histograms of the contemporaneous wage/employment elasticities obtained from the het-
erogeneous specication are plotted in Figures 3 (a) and (b) for Portugal and Germany
respectively.34
The gures show two things: First that the elasticities are far more dispersed across rms
in Portugal compared with Germany (the variance in Portugal is three times larger than in
Germany) and second that the average elasticity  the key determinant of the bias in our
33In the analytical model considered in the online appendix the covariances driving the biases approximate
(for small changes in wages and employment) these elasticities.
34The elasticities with respect to lagged employment were negative on average for Portugal but positive
for Germany; histograms are shown in the online appendix. The variance was again three times higher in
Portugal than Germany. As noted in the text the bias formula given in the annex predicts that in neither
case do these lagged comovements matter very much in determining the bias.
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Figure 4: RTT Bias when Firm Employment is Controlled for
analytical model35  is much higher in the former than the latter (:06 in Portugal versus :01
in Germany). Given the arguments above we would expect the bias to be larger in Portugal
than Germany  as indeed can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. More pertinently for the current
discussion, we would expect the RTT proles obtained from the homogeneous specication
to be close to FYFE for Germany but not for Portugal. For Portugal we would expect only
the heterogenous specication to deliver RTT estimates close to those of FYFE instead.
To examine these statements we compute the di¤erences between the following RTT
proles for both countries: a) FYFE and the homogenous specication (Hom) and b) FYFE
and the heterogenous specication (Het). These di¤erences are plotted for Portugal and
Germany in Figures 4 (a) and (b), respectively. For comparison purposes we also add a line
representing the bias in MFE, i.e., the gap between FYFE and MFE in Figures 1 and 2. In
these graphs the height above the x-axis represents the bias in each respective specication,
i.e., the extent to which each respective specication fails to match the RTT generated by
the FYFE specication. The "FYFE Minus MFE" line is the "baseline" bias, the "FYFE
Minus Het" line is the bias from the heterogenous model and the "FYFE Minus Hom" line
is the bias from the homogenous model.
We see that for Germany the homogeneous specication can eliminate quite a good
proportion of the baseline bias; its prole lies halfway between the MFE line and the x-axis
implying that about one half of the baseline bias has been removed. The heterogeneous
specication line lies below but close to the x-axis  which we could interpret as a complete
35In the general version of the model where rms may have di¤erent sizes and rates of exit it is a weighted
average of elasticities that matter. Only when rms are the same does the bias depend on the simple average
of the elasticities. As we have only large rms in our sample we might expect them to be close in terms of
size and possibly also in terms of quit rates.
19
removal of the bias. For Portugal things are very di¤erent. The homogeneous specication
has virtually no impact on the bias  the "FYFE Minus Hom" line lies practically on top of
the baseline. By contrast allowing heterogeneous comovements has far more leverage than
it does in Germany  most of the bias is removed by controlling for heterogenous across
rm wage/employment comovements. These results are consistent with what we predicted
in the earlier discussion; the extent to which the bias may be removed by adding single
coe¢ cient employment terms depends on how homogenous cross rm wage/employment
comovements are  where they are heterogenous adding employment terms with common
cross rm coe¢ cients have no impact on the bias.
2.7 Equal Treatment or Unequal Treatment?
Up to now we have focused on rm wage/employment comovements driven by wage "shocks"
that are common to all workers. It is possible however that wage components of new hires
alone may be causing bias and that these components are not present in incumbent wages.
Suppose for example that the rm was hiring under conditions of monopsony. Suppose also
that when protability is high, hiring is high and new hires are brought in at a wage above
that of incumbents. This would drive up the rms average wage in that year and drive down
the rms average tenure. Once again we would get downward bias in RTT. But this e¤ect
is not an equal treatment e¤ect  it is driven entirely by comovements between the new
hire wage and employment. This new-hire-only e¤ect works via the same mechanism as our
equal treatment story but if it were to be the only mechanism behind the bias it suggests
that a more e¢ cient empirical procedure to remove it would focus on new hire wages only.36
In the light of the previous discussion, it would be interesting to see if augmenting FYFE
with rm-year controls for newly hired workers only raises the RTT prole further. We
call this augmented specication NHFY for convenience. Unfortunately NHFY will as a by-
product also remove from the RTT prole the e¤ects of wage growth during the rst year of
tenure. If the RTT gradient is steeper in the rst year of tenure than in later years, removing
it will move the overall RTT prole upwards. To allow for this and to be able to compare
"like with like" we also strip out the initial tenure e¤ect from the initial FYFE specication
by adding a new hire dummy to it. Estimating FYFE with its new hire dummy and NHFY
produced RTT proles that were within .2% of each other (with NHFY being slightly higher
in both countries).
The key takeaway of this exercise is that equal treatment wage components are the main
driver behind RTT bias; adjusting additionally for movements in new hire wages has little
36If new hires receive a premium/discount in wages that is permanent  as would be consistent with
models of full commitment by worker and rm  these will be absorbed in match xed e¤ects and will not
a¤ect estimates of RTT. It is short lived changes to the wages of a new hire, related to a rms employment
decisions, that we have in mind; for example, a premium in the rst year of employment and thereafter
being paid at some standard rate. Contracting models with limited commitment, for example, often have
this short-run property (e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991, Rudanko, 2009).
20
incremental on the RTT prole
3 RTT and Implicit Wage Contracts
The purpose of this paper has been to derive unbiased estimates of the causal e¤ects of tenure
on wages: that is the e¤ect on wages of experimentally increasing tenure by one year whilst
keeping everything else in the economy (including for example outside options) constant. To
achieve unbiasedness we have shown that it is necessary to control for equal treatment wage
shocks as well as the more traditional unobserved match e¤ects. Wages may vary with tenure
for a number of reasons, not least because of returns to experience which are general market
returns; but they also respond to internal o¤ers. As discussed above, RTT estimates may
be capturing the latter  a reward to the accumulation of specic capital, either human or
physical. These returns might accrue to the worker for a variety of reasons: bargaining over
quasi-rents for example, or a rm being prepared to respond to outside o¤ers (distributed
independently of the value of specic capital) to keep a worker with specic capital in the
rm (see, e.g., Lentz and Roys, 2015).
However, the existence of quasi-rents (due to specic capital accumulation or search
frictions), or the ability of rms to commit, may allow contracts in which wages do not
correspond to marginal products in a time invariant fashion; a classic example would be
backloaded wages to reduce turnover (as in Holmstrom, 1983). If there is no observable
variable with which to control for contract driven wage growth (as would be implied by
backloading say) then our estimates of RTT will include such e¤ects. If this were true, only
the results from a calibrated theoretical model could separately identify contract and human
capital e¤ects from estimated RTT. In this scenario our bias correction would yield consistent
estimates of an "RTT+wage-contract" e¤ect. Even in this scenario these estimates would be
useful raw inputs to a calibration exercise of a theoretical model that attempts to separately
identify the respective e¤ects. If there is an observable control for wage contract e¤ects it
should be used in order to be able to identify pure rm specic human capital RTT. One class
of contract models that do o¤er observable controls for wage contracts arises from Beaudry
and Di Nardos (1991) paper on implicit contracts.
Beaudry and Di Nardo (1991) developed a model where  modulo rm specic human
capital  the minimum unemployment rate since the worker joined the rm ("minu" for
short) was a su¢ cient statistic for within rm wage movements.37 This spawned an empirical
literature that added minu to Mincer equations to assess its importance. The ndings
37In their analysis wages will be weakly increasing with tenure since wages are increasing with the tightest
labor market conditions within the current job. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) argue that the results are
consistent with a match quality, as opposed to an implicit contract, interpretation: better matches, which
pay more, are more likely to survive periods of hightened job o¤ers, proxied by cumulative low unemployment
rates, and o¤er evidence to support this view. Bellou and Kaymak (2016) on the other hand nd evidence
for a history dependence in wages for stayers which suggests contracts do play a role.
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in our paper have ramications for this literature. Minu is intrinsically correlated with
tenure  it falls in a weakly monotone fashion with it. Failing to control for positive rm
wage/employment comovements biases the minu coe¢ cient for much the same reasons as
it biases RTT: higher rm wages associated with higher rm employment will lead to lower
average rm tenure. Given that minu is negatively correlated with tenure it would be
tempting to state that this bias is positive (towards zero for a negative coe¢ cient). But in
Snell et al. (2016) we argued that the inclusion of tenure in the regression complicates the
bias and in general it cannot be signed. Nevertheless, using the Portuguese data we showed
that adding rm-year xed e¤ects to a specication such as MFE that also includes minu
dramatically a¤ects our inferences; the coe¢ cient on minu falls (in absolute value) from a
highly signicant value of  :93 to a borderline signicant value of  :29. Whatever the sign
of the bias in this context, equal treatment wage components should be controlled for; at
best they are unwanted noise and at worst they cause bias.
Finally there is a recent empirical literature that tries to establish the extent to which the
contract hiring wage is sensitive to conditions at the time of hiring. In this literature focus
is on the signicance of a measure of the state of the labour market (typically aggregate
unemployment) and a "new hire dummy". If this variable  "deltau" for short  is found
to have a signicantly negative impact on wages it implies that rms take advantage of poor
labour market conditions when hiring. As with minu, deltau is negatively correlated with
tenure and once again failure to control for rm-year xed e¤ects would cause its estimated
e¤ect to be biased.
To sum up this discussion, controlling for the e¤ects of wage contracts is crucial to be able
to identify human capital RTT; but controlling for equal treatment components of wages is
essential to get good estimates of both.
4 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that the positive comovement of equal treatment wage com-
ponents and rm employment causes signicant bias in RTT. We showed that our equal
treatment shocks are highly persistent (unit root or near unit root processes) and that con-
trolling for them signicantly changes the RTT estimates. This is important as we would
expect only persistent wage shocks to drive rm quits and rm hiring. We concluded that
match quality and our equal treatment shocks are two of a kind  persistent shocks to wages
that impact a workers tenure. Finally we found that controlling for these two shocks reduces
the residual error to (near) white noise. This is consistent with the argument that adding
rm-year xed e¤ects and match xed e¤ects to Mincer equations is necessary to control
for those wage components that are jointly endogenous with tenure. This gives us some
condence that our bias corrected reduced form estimates of RTT are causal. We conclude
with some additional ad hoc observations arising from our work.
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First, if one is purely interested in e¤ects that vary only with year and tenure then
equal treatment shocks are "noise" and removing them seems a sensible thing to do. Once
match quality is controlled for only the cross tenure/year movements in wages are relevant
to estimating RTT; components of wages that are common to workers in rm j in year t
cannot add information to this.
Second, our FYFE correction allows for the possibility that rms may have heterogeneous
wage and employment co-trends. Fast (slow) growing and high (low) wage growth rms
would have lower (higher) average tenure and higher (lower) average wages. This type of
issue has been discussed before in the RTT literature but as far as we know it has not been
analyzed.
Third, in this paper we focused on MFE as a "baseline" specication or method. But in
fact we could add rm-year xed e¤ects to any of the three other methods to control for the
bias we have identied.
Finally, the need to control for FYFE would seem to rule out the use of small random
samples of workers to obtain unbiased RTT estimates. Such samples are unlikely to contain
two workers in the same rm. Just how many workers per rm are required to remove the
bias e¤ectively is unclear and a subject for future research.
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